24 lines
		
	
	
		
			1.2 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Plaintext
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			24 lines
		
	
	
		
			1.2 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Plaintext
		
	
	
	
	
	
| What:		security/evm
 | |
| Date:		March 2011
 | |
| Contact:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
 | |
| Description:
 | |
| 		EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
 | |
| 		against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
 | |
| 		HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
 | |
| 		value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it
 | |
| 		with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.
 | |
| 		The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl.  Until
 | |
| 		EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully
 | |
| 		loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM
 | |
| 		can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but
 | |
| 		returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.  Loading the key and signaling EVM
 | |
| 		should be done as early as possible.  Normally this is done
 | |
| 		in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part
 | |
| 		of the trusted boot.  For more information on creating and
 | |
| 		loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
 | |
| 		Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt.  (A sample dracut
 | |
| 		patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables
 | |
| 		EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)
 |